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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Compromise and Settlement-Release--Insurance-Liability
Carrier's Settlement as a Bar to InsuredPs Suit
In a recent Georgia decision the insured was involved in an
automobile collision with a motor vehicle owned by the Garden
Lakes Company and driven by Spector. The insurer entered into a
settlement agreement with Garden Lakes and Spector, paying them a
sum of money in consideration for a general release executed by them,
releasing the insured from all consequences of the collision. The
settlement was made without the insured's knowledge or consent,
under a provision of the policy providing that "the company may
make such investigation and settlement of any claim or suit as it
deems expedient." Thereafter the insured brought an action for
damages against Garden Lakes and Spector. The defendants pleaded
the release as a defense. The trial court held this defense untenable
since the insured had neither acquiesced in nor ratified the release.
The defendant, Garden Lakes, then amended its answer to set up
a counterclaim against the insured.
The insurer, being obligated to pay any judgment rendered on
the counterclaim against the insured, sought to plead the release as
a defense to the counterclaim. The insured contended that to allow
the insurer to plead the release would defeat her claim against
Spector and Garden Lakes. The insurer brought the present action
seeking a declaratory judgment of its rights, naming Spector,
Garden Lakes, and the insured as defendants. The Court of Appeals
of Georgia held that the insured could prevent the insurer from
pleading the release, and that the release was void when repudiated
by the insured.
A release for money payment may take either of two forms. It
may provide either that the payee releases the payor, or that each
releases the other.2 Generally it is held that the legal 'effect of either
form is the same. Although the former provides only that the payee
releases the payor, it is generally held that it will bar the payor's
claims as well.' In reaching this result, it is reasoned that the parties
' Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Brooks, 106 -Ga. App. 427, 127 S.E.2d. 183
(19.62).. C R. 8(5
2See 38 N.C.L. R~v. 81,* 83 (1959)'
' Giles v. Smith, 80 .Ga. App. 540, 56 S.E.2d 860 (1949); Brown v.
_Hughes, 251 Iowa 44.4,,99 N.W,2d 305 (1960); Graves Truck Line, Inc. v.
Home'Oil Co., 180"Karn. 594, 305 P.2d 1053 (1957); Cannon v. Parker, 249
N.C. 279, 106 S.E.2d 229"(I958)'; Traveler's Indem. Co. v. Home'Mut. Ins.
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made a complete settlement of all their claims, and that the payor
admitted his liability by making payment to the releasor.4 This
result has been reached even where the release contained an express
provision that it was not to be considered an admission of liability.5
A few courts, however, hold that a release does not bar the
payor's claims unless it so provides by its terms. Reasons given for
this view are (1) that it is difficult to construe the language to be
an admission of liability by the payor,6 and (2) that the payor should
be able to "buy his peace" without defeating his own cause of
action.1
It is suggested that the preferred rule would be to make the
release prima facie evidence of the parties' intention to make a final
settlement of all claims arising out of the accident.8 If it could be
shown that the payee knew or should have known 9 of the payor's
intention to maintain a suit against him, the presumption would be
overcome. Since it would seem that in most instances the parties
intend a release to be a final settlement of all the claims of both
Co., 15 Wis. 2d 137, 111 N.W.2d 751 (1961); cf. Mensing v. Sturgeon, 250
Iowa 918, 97 N.W.2d 145 (1959); England v. Yellow Transit Co., 240
Mo. App. 968, 225 S.W.2d 366 (1949); Kelleher v. Lozzi, 7 N.J. 17, 80
A.2d 196 (1951); Heinemann Creameries, Inc. v. Milwaukee Auto. Ins. Co.,
270 Wis. 443, 71 N.W.2d 395, rehearing denied, 72 N.W.2d 102 (1955).
Contra, Schledewitz v. Consumers Oil Co-op., Inc., 144 Colo. 518, 357 P.2d
63 (1960) ; Ruf v. Wittenberg, 13 Pa. D.&C.2d 672 (1957) ; cf. Crawford v.
McLeod, 64 Ala. 240 (1879); Baldwin v. New York Central & H.R.R.R., 2
N.Y. Supp. 481, 56 N.Y. Super. Ct. 607, aff'd 121 N.Y. 684, 24 N.E. 1098
(1888); Penn Dixie Lines, Inc. v. Grannick, 238 N.C. 552, 78 S.E.2d 410
(1953); Wade v. Southern Ry., 89 S.C. 280, 71 S.E. 859 (1911).
'See, e.g., Giles v. Smith, supra note 3; Cannon v. Parker, supra note 3;
cf. Heinemann Creameries, Inc. v. Milwaukee Auto. Ins. Co., supra note
3.
5 Brown v. Hughes, 251 Iowa 444, 99 N.W.2d 305 (1960) ; Graves Truck
Line, Inc. v. Home Oil Co., 180 Kan. 594, 305 P.2d- 1053 (1957); cf. Mensing
v. Sturgeon, 250 Iowa 918, 97 N.W.2d 145 (1959); Heinemann Creameries,
Inc. v.Milwaukee Auto. Ins. Co., 270 Wis. 443, 71 N.W.2d 395 (1955). As
stated in Giles v. Smith, 80 Ga. App. 540, 543, 56 S.E.2d 860, 862 (1949),
"it ivould be anomalous indeed'for the plaintiffs, to -pay Jackson the $275
and then sue'him to recover the very money they had paid him."
' See Schledewitz v. Consumers Oil Co-op., Inc.,' 144 Colo. 518, 357
P.2d 63 (1960).
I See 1956 Wis. L. REV. 305; cf. Crawford v. McLeod, 64 Ala. 240
'(1879); Wade v. Southern Ry., 89 S.C. 280, 71 S.E. 859 (1911).
SThis was the rule used in Kelleher v. Lozti, 7 N.J. 17, 80 A.2d 196
(1951). See Brown v. Hughes, 251 Iowa 444, 99 N.W.2d 305 (1960); Can-
non v..Parkef, '249 N.C. 279,. 106 S.E.2d 229 (1958).
'What an "ordinarily reasonable and reasoning man" in the place'of
the' releasor' af- the "tinie of the execution of the reledse would 'take the
settlement to mean was the mehsure for the objective testused in Mensiig
v. Sturgeon, 250 Iowa 918, 930, 97 N.W.2d 145,151 (.959). .
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parties,'0 such a rule would have the desired result of effectuating the
intent of the parties. Although injustice might occasionally result
from the application of 'such a rule, due to the difficulty of proving
what the parties actually intended, such a result would seem less likely
than under alternative rules. To hold a release to be a final settlement
between the parties as a matter of law-as appears to be the rule in
the principal case"---would deny the parties the right to give effect
to a contrary intention, even though they might be able to prove it.
On the other hand, to hold that a release gives rise to either a con-
clusive or a rebuttable presumption that the parties did not intend to
bar the payor from bringing later claims would be to ignore the
findings of the great majority of courts that the release was intended
as a final settlement. A third alternative, that it be left to the court or
jury to decide what the parties intended by the release in a given
situation, would leave the law uncertain as to the effect of a release
and would do nothing to solve the problem in the absence of any evi-
dence as to the intention of the parties.
It is a well-settled rule in Georgia 2 and the United States' 8 that
an insurer cannot bind its insured by settling without his knowledge
and consent. Where such settlement is made, however, and the in-
sured brings suit against the releasor, who in turn counterclaims,
it has been the subject of speculation whether the release could be
used as a defense to the counterclaim. A recent law review note1
4
suggested that since the releasor had received all to which he was
legally entitled under the circumstances, it would seem bound to fore-
go suing the insured. Consequently, the insured should be able to
'oThis statement is made on the assumption that a majority of the courts
which have considered the question have correctly decided that the parties
intended the release to be a complete settlement of all claims. See, e.g., Giles
v. Smith, 80 Ga. App. 540, 56 S.E.2d 860 (1949).
1 The concurring opinion suggests a different interpretation of the release
if the defendant knew that the insurer was not representing the insured in
making the settlement, and suggests that this was a factual issue which
should be determined before the effect of the release was decided. However,
the majority decided the effect of the release without any determination of
the actual intent of the parties. From this it may be inferred that the
court held the effect of the release to be the same, no matter what the intent
of the parties.
12 See Foremost Dairies, Inc. v. Campbell Coal Co., 57 Ga. App. 500,
196 S.E. 279 (1938).
1" See, e.g., Fikes v. Johnson, 220 Ark 448, 248 S.W.2d 362 (1952);
Campbell v. Brown, 251 N.C. 214, 110 S.E.2d 897 (1959)." Note, 38 N.C.L. REv. 81 (1959).
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defeat the releasor's counterclaim by setting up the release as a
counterclaim. . ",
Since the writing of that note, however, two cases have-been
litigated where an insured set up -a release in defense of the releasor's
counterclaim. Neither case was decided on the grounds suggested.
In Faught v. Washam'5 the Supreme Court of Missouri recog-
nized the rule that ordinarily a release is ratified by one pleading it.
However, the court reasoned that the, general rule would not apply
so- as to bind the insured in this case because the release was pleaded
for the benefit of the insurer and not the insured.' .-
In Cochran v. Bell'7 the insured's attorney -elicited from the
releasor on cross-examination the fact that-he had signed a release
of all claims against the insured. This release was made the basis of
a motion to dismiss the counterclaim. The. Court of- Appeals -of
Georgia stated that the insured had relied on the release to obtain a
legal advantage for herself and that this constituted ratification "as
effectively as. though the release had been pleaded in the plaintiff-
insured's petition.""'
The principal case extended the holding of Cochran to the situa-
tion where the insurer pleads the release in defense to the counter-
claim. In such a -case, the court reasoned that the insured would be
barred in the action against the releasor.' This result would have
15 329 S.W.2d 588 (Mo. 1959).
"The court pointed out that the insurer was obligated under the policy
to pay any damages against the insured, resulting from the counterclaim,
since the damages sought were less than the limit of the insurer's liability
under the policy. Consequently, according to the court, the insured had no
financial interest in pleading. the release in defense but was pleading it' for
the sole benefit of the insurer who, under Missouri practice and procedure;
could not be joined as.a party to the action.
It would seem, however; that it would be to a plaintiff's benefit to defeat
the defendant's counterclaim to his complaint. The fact that he had a col-
lateral contract with a third party providing that the third party would pay
any judgments against him should have no bearing on the action between
the plaintiff and the defendant. In that respect the defense would benefit
the plaintiff-insured, even though the insurance contract would prevent
it from benefiting him monetarily.
17 102 Ga. App. 617, 117 S.E.2d 645 (1960).
16Id. at 619, 117 S.E.2d at 646.
'. In a concurring opinion it was suggested that the effect of the release
being used as a defense should depend upon whether or not the releasor knew
that the insurer was acting without authority in making the settlement. If
the releasor had such knowledge,, he would be presumed to know that the
insurer could not defeat any claim that the insured might have against the
releasor. On the other hand, if he assumed the insurer to be acting as an
agent of the insured, the releasor would have thought that the insured
1963]
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allowed the insurer to defeat the insured's action for substantial
damages by settling even a small claim against the insured arising out
of the same cause of action. Thus the court held that the insured
could prevent the insurer from pleading the release as a defense.
The principal case-would seem to deny the insurer the right of
settlement and the right to control litigation-rights which were
given to it by the policy. However, since the insurer is chargeable
with knowledge that an insurer cannot bind its insured by making
settlement without his knowledge and consent,2" it should know that
the effect of the provisions in the contract would not give it those
rights.- If it wanted a final settlement of the claim against its in-
sured, the insurer would be forced to get the insured's permission.2
When compared to the alternatives,22 it would seem that the court
made the preferred choice.
CowLEs LIIPFERT
Constitutional Law-Cruel and Unusual Punishment-
Criminality of a Status
The eighth amendment of the United States Constitution pro-
vides: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines im-
posed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." The origin of
this provision of the Bill of Rights can be traced to the Magna
would be bound by the settlement. When he learned otherwise, the
releasor could repudiate the settlement by returning the consideration to the
insurer. To so hold would qualify the holding of Cochran and lend support
to the contention of the law review note where the releasor executed the
release for money consideration only. In such a case, ratification by the
insured should not release him, since the release was not part of the settle-
ment..
The concurring judge probably assumed that by making a settlement
with the releasor, the insured impliedly held itself out to be an agent of the
insured. But see Note, 38 N.C.L. REV. 81, 83 (1959), where it was sug-
gested that the releasor would be chargeable with knowledge that an insurer
cannot bind the insured without his consent and, therefore, could not be misled
by the insurer's making the settlement.
20 See Parham v. Robins, 197 Ga. 386, 29 S.E.2d 608 (1944).
" Unless a release is held to be conclusive evidence of the intent to settle
all claims of both parties arising from the same cause of action, the insurer
could also make a final settlement of the claim against the insured by first
notifying the releasor that it was not an agent of the insured. Of course
the insurer could still get authority from the insured to make such settle-
ment.
" Other alternatives would be to allow: (1) a release to bar only the
claims of the releasor; (2) an insurer to bind its insured by settling without
his knowledge and consent; (3) the insurer to plead the release without
it being considered a ratification by the insured.
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